Background: What makes a movement feel voluntary, and what might make it feel involuntary?
What makes a movement feel voluntary, and what might make it feel involuntary? Self-agency is the experience that we are the cause of our own actions. Contemporary motor theory postulates a feed-forward model that normal self-generated movement is accompanied by a sensory prediction of the motor outcome. The matched comparison of predicted outcome and visual or proprioceptive sensory feedback from the actual movement gives rise to a sense of selfagency. 1, 2 The monitoring of the discrepancy between the intended and actual outcome has been associated with the inferior parietal and prefrontal cortex and cerebellum. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] To understand the mechanisms underlying the sense of agency, we studied patients with conversion disorder, [8] [9] [10] or involuntary neurologic symptoms not explained by a neurologic or medical disorder. Studies of conversion disorder date back to the work of Charcot and Freud, but unexplained neurologic symptoms remain common and poorly understood. Aberrant conversion motor symptoms such as tremor critically use voluntary motor pathways, but patients experience the movements as involuntary. [9] [10] [11] We investigated the neurobiologic basis of lack of agency by comparing conversion tremor with voluntary mimicked tremor in a within-subject design using fMRI. METHODS Subjects. Subjects were recruited over a 5-year period from patients assessed at the Human Motor Control Section, National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke. Inclusion criteria included "clinically definite" psychogenic movement disorder, a form of conversion disorder, 8, 10 intention or postural tremor without resting tremor or head movements, ability to mimic movements without triggering symptoms, and absence of other major neurologic disorders (e.g., traumatic brain injury, stroke, central inflammatory diseases, tumors, dementia, neurodegenerative diseases). We did not exclude minor neurologic disorders as part of the study, but none were identified in our patients. All patients had diagnoses of conversion disorder.
Standard protocol approvals and patient consents. The study was approved by the NIH Institutional Review Board, and all patients gave informed consent.
Task design. While undergoing fMRI, subjects performed two 25-second pseudorandomized conditions interspersed with 25second rest (R) periods: they positioned their affected forearm to trigger their conversion tremor (C) or they voluntarily reproduced their conversion tremor in the same arm at the same frequency and amplitude (V). Five C and 5 V conditions were repeated over 3 runs (total 27.5 minutes). Verbal instructions ("tremor," "mimic," "rest") indicated the condition start. Imaging sessions were videotaped.
Imaging procedure. Imaging was performed with a 1.5-T General Electric (Fairfield, CT) scanner using an 8-channel head coil. Twenty-one axial slices with a repetition time of 2.5 seconds were acquired (echo time 25 milliseconds, slice thickness/gap 5/1 mm, flip angle 90°, matrix size 64 ϫ 64 mm). The first 6 dummy scans were discarded to allow for equilibrium effects. fMRI data analysis was performed using SPM5 (Statistical Parametric Mapping; www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). Data preprocessing consisted of slice timing correction, within-subject realignment, spatial normalization, and smoothing using a 6-mm gaussian kernel. Twelve subjects were scanned. Data from 4 subjects were excluded because of excessive head motion artifact (Ͼ2 mm).
Blocks without sustained movement or with contralateral limb movement for more than 5 seconds were discarded. Videotaped tremor blocks were compared with mimic blocks within subjects. A rater blinded to subject and condition compared conditions on a visual analog scale for overall similarity in amplitude and frequency (1 ϭ not similar; 10 ϭ very similar).
A canonical hemodynamic response function was modeled to the block onset and used as a covariate in a general linear model. Contrasts were compared using a random effects group model. To assess main C and V activations, we assessed C-R and V-R contrasts using a single-sample t test. To assess overlapping activity in C and V, we used an inclusive mask (2-sample t test, mask p Ͻ 0.05). We compared differences between C and V by comparing C-R and V-R contrasts using a paired t test. A p value Ͻ0.05 family-wise error (FWE) whole brain corrected was considered significant. We assessed functional connectivity using a psychophysiologic interaction comparing C vs V ( p Ͻ 0.001 uncorrected extent threshold Ͼ8 voxels was considered significant).
RESULTS
All subjects were diagnosed with conversion disorder (7/8 clinically assessed in person and 1/8 assessed by phone interview by a psychiatrist [V.V.]) (5 women, mean age 42 [SD 8.9] years; symptom duration mean 9.9 [SD 5.6] years [range 1-25 years]; 7 right handed; 6 right, 1 left, and 1 bilateral upper extremity tremor; psychological issues at symptom onset: 2/8 major depression, 3/8 generalized anxiety disorder, 4/8 psychosocial stressors; 1/8 taking antidepressants). None were clinically depressed at the time of the study (based on DSM-IV criteria based on assessment in person or by phone interview [V.V.]). Mean tremor similarity scores within individuals were 8.9 (SD 2.1).
The global maximum in the C-R and V-R contrasts was the cerebellar vermis and secondarily the left sensorimotor cortex (figure, A). The paired t test comparison of C-R ϾV-R showed right temporoparietal junction (TPJ) hypoactivity (peak voxel: Montreal Neurological Institute x, y, z coordinates ϭ 56, Ϫ56, 14 mm; Z score ϭ 5.03; cluster size ϭ 2) ( p Ͻ 0.05 FWE whole brain corrected; figure, B). Given the low sample size, individual contrasts were also separately inspected (7/8 had right TPJ hypoactivity at a threshold of p Ͻ 0.01 uncorrected).
In the psychophysiological interaction (seed voxel based on right TPJ peak voxel, radius 0.8 mm) contrast of C-V, the TPJ showed less connectivity with bilateral sensorimotor cortices, cerebellar vermis and ventral cingulate/medial prefrontal cortex, and right precuneus/superior parietal and left ventral striatum (figure, C, and table). DISCUSSION We studied patients with conversion tremor using a within-subject comparison of involuntary conversion tremor and voluntary reproduction of their conversion tremor to assess for the correlates of loss of self-agency. We demonstrated that C-R vs V-R was associated with right TPJ hypoactivity, a region involved in multisensory integration. During C as compared with V, the TPJ had lower functional connectivity with sensorimotor regions and limbic regions.
From 156 patients in the database seen over a 5-year period, only 8 patients were included in the study because of technical demands of our study that would permit comparative analysis of voluntary vs involuntary movement. Recruiting for functional imaging studies on conversion disorder has been difficult, with reported sample sizes in the literature ranging from 1 to 8. [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] The present study was limited by the lack of a healthy control group, which we did not include given the lack of involuntary trem- ors. We did not include a neurologic control group such as PD or essential tremor because the symptoms would not cease at rest and would be difficult to mimic without triggering their symptoms. Thus, having a patient with conversion disorder performing voluntary movement as a within-subject control was the optimal control condition to answer our question of interest. We controlled for movement differences with video recording and did not observe differences in the cortical motor areas in the contrast of C-V or V-C, confirming that possible differences in motor output were slight and involuntary and voluntary movement involves similar motor pathways. We also note that the inclusion of only patients with positionally triggered tremor symptoms may limit generalizability. Furthermore, the inclusion of patients with different lateralizing symptoms may present a limitation; however, we suggest that our findings may represent more general mechanisms that have been attributed to the right hemisphere.
Decety and Lamm 6 have proposed that the fundamental role of the right TPJ is a low-level computational process involving the prediction of external events by functioning as a general comparator of internal predictions with actual external events. This process is suggested to explain the various low-and high-level cognitive processes attributed to the right TPJ, including self-agency, [2] [3] [4] 6, 19 theory of mind, 20 and spatial reorienting of visual attention. 21 Certainly, studies on theory of mind suggesting that the attribution of mental states to self and to others involves the right TPJ may be relevant in conversion disorder. Spatial attention may also be relevant, emphasizing that the semiautonomous generation of C is associated with a different awareness of spatial movement as compared with the voluntary genera-tion of V. However, we suggest that our findings reflect a lack of self-agency, which is not only a symptom fundamental to the experience of conversion disorder but a feature core to the definition of conversion disorder. The mechanisms underlying selfagency, by definition, fit in well with the role of the right TPJ as a comparator of internal sensory prediction and the actual sensory state.
Stimulation of the inferior parietal cortex has been recently demonstrated to be associated with the illusion of controlling movement (i.e., the experience of controlling movement when no actual movement occurred), which the authors termed the sense of "conscious intention," and has been suggested to be related to activation of the network involved in movement monitoring through forward modeling. 3 In healthy volunteers, agency has been studied using self-generated action and visual feedback manipulation implicating the right inferior parietal cortex and TPJ. 2, [4] [5] [6] [7] In this context, loss of agency is associated with right inferior parietal cortex hyperactivity, which is the opposite of what we observed. In visual feedback manipulation experiments of voluntary movement, the mismatch involves an intact higherlevel motor intention. However, in our study, motor intention is almost certainly abnormal. The movement arises without conscious intention, and there may not be a feed-forward signal. The lack of feedforward signal is a possible interpretation of the decreased connectivity of the TPJ and the sensorimotor cortices and cerebellar vermis. Thus, despite proprioceptive feedback from the movement, there is no mismatch detection, and activation is decreased. C vs V was also associated with lower connectivity between the TPJ and limbic regions (ventral anterior cingulate and ventral striatum), suggesting less limbic involvement in conversion movement evaluation.
The right TPJ has also been implicated in the pathologic states of vestibular illusions (of elevation, rotation), multisensory illusions (or visual shortening and movement of limbs), autoscopy (or the experience of seeing one's body in extrapersonal space), and out-of-body experiences (or the experience of seeing one's body and environment from a location outside of the physical body). 22, 23 For example, TPJ lesions 22 and high-frequency stimulation 23 targeting the superior temporal gyrus with increased functional activity of the right TPJ have been associated with out-ofbody experiences. Similarly, mental imagery of an out-of-body experience in healthy volunteers is associated with TPJ activity, and transcranial magnetic stimulation impairs this specific mental imagery. 24 The phenomenon of disembodiment has been suggested to be a failure to integrate proprioceptive, visual, and tactile information regarding one's body (disintegration in personal space) along with an additional disintegration between personal (vestibular) and extrapersonal (visual) space that occurs during impaired consciousness. 22 There may indeed be similarities between these phenomena and conversion tremor on the general level of multisensory integration, hence implicating similar regions. However, we have confined our interpretation to the feed-forward model comparing sensory feedback and prediction to explain the clinical phenomena of the experience of subjective involuntary movement. Furthermore, conversion tremor does not involve integration within personal or extrapersonal space, and our findings suggest right TPJ hypoactivity, whereas out-ofbody experiences are associated with the opposite. We cannot comment on whether the TPJ is intrinsically impaired and suggest rather that the process of generating the sensory prediction in conversion tremor may be abnormal. It is possible that a range of symptoms, from that of nonconscious "nervous" foot tapping/hand drumming (which presumably also uses voluntary pathways) to Ldopa-induced dyskinesias 25 and other involuntary movement disorders (which are less likely to use voluntary pathways), may be perceived as involuntary in part because of reduced feed-forward signaling. Whether this mechanism holds for conversion paralysis or other conversion symptoms is not clear. Further studies will be able to clarify one of these hypotheses.
Conversion movements use voluntary motor pathways and yet are paradoxically experienced as involuntary. Our study highlights a potential abnormality of integration of the internal sensory prediction with the actual sensory state in conversion tremor. We note that this mechanism does not address the question of how or why the conversion tremor is initiated, but may give insight into why it is experienced as involuntary. This theory is further compatible with other theories put forward in conversion motor disorders, including that of abnormal motor conceptualization, 13 limbic interference 26 with motor function, and hyperactive monitoring of internal states. 27 This mechanism may reflect a more general process of comparison of internal predictions with actual events attributed to the right TPJ. 6 The absence of a feed-forward signal in conversion tremor would lead to a lack of a match in the TPJ, thus leading to the crux of conversion movements, the feeling that one is not the cause of one's actions. 
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